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Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
and Religious Institutions' Auxiliary Uses
Sara C. Galvant

INTRODUCTION

Religious institutions have long offered their congregants services that go
beyond worship. From access to schools or community halls to services as
basic as parking, religious institutions necessarily use their land and resources
for more than just religious observance. But particularly in the last two
decades, they have begun expanding far beyond their traditional offerings to a
wider and more diverse array of "auxiliary uses"--non-worship uses that are
affiliated with a religious institution. Religious institutions now run insurance
agencies, hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and transportation
companies.1

They

manage

retail

stores

that

sell

religiously

themed

4
3
merchandise, 2 incorporate popular franchises like Starbucks and McDonald's,
finance recording studios,5 and operate credit unions and banks.6 The nation's
second-largest church (with 30,000 congregants) has even begun developing

t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2006; M.Sc., University of Oxford, 2003; B.Arch./B.A.,
University of Texas, 2001. The author wishes to thank David Lenzi, Christopher G. Bradley, and
Professor Noah Feldman for their very insightful comments.
1. See Kamron Keele, A Plea for the Repeal of Section 107: No More Tax-Free Mansions for
Dubious "Ministersof the Gospel," 56 TAX LAW. 73, 97 (2002).
2. See Carrie Coolidge, Christian Capitalism: David vs. Goliath, FORBES.COM, Sept. 15, 2003,
http://www.forbes.com/2003/09/15/cz-cc0915wmt.html.
3. See, e.g., Christian Life Center, The Book and Bean Cafd, http://www.clconline.org/IHTML/
CoffeeShop.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2005); Covenant Celebration Church, Driving Directions [and
Starbucks hours], http://www.covenantcelebration.org/aboutus directions.asp (last visited Oct. 18,
2005).
4. See, e.g., Maria Jolly, A Harvest of Generational Blessings, CHURCH EXECUTIVE, May 2004,
available at http://www.churchexecutive.com/2004/05/Aharvestof generational-blessings.asp (noting
that along with its McDonald's franchise, Houston's 12,000-member Brentwood Baptist Church
operates a transitional housing facility for people with HIV/AIDS, lifelong learning center, child
development center, maintenance facility, and credit union on its I l-acre campus).
5. See, e.g., Welcome to Arrow Records, http://wvvw.arrow-records.com (last visited Oct. 18,
2005); see also Biography of Dr. Creflo A. Dollar, http://www.creflodollarministries.org/
aboutlbio t.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) (revealing that the leadership of Arrow Records includes
the wife of the pastor of World Changers Church International).
6. See, e.g., Mary Claire Dale, Church Credit Unions Grow, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE (Ind.), July
24, 2004, at 2C; Brentwood Baptist Church Federal Credit Union, http://bbccredit.gcg2.net (last visited
Oct. 7, 2005).

Yale Law & Policy Review

Vol. 24:207, 2006

7
both a 1200-home neighborhood and a 280-unit gated retirement community.
The expanding breadth of the auxiliary uses offered by modem religious
institutions raises the critical question considered by this Note: Which auxiliary
uses should government protect, and how far should those protections be
extended?
The worship uses of religious institutions have long been granted special
protections by the government of the United States. According to the Supreme

Court in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, "[f]ew concepts are more

deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life, beginning with preRevolutionary colonial times, than for the government to exercise at the very8
least [a] kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise."
But government has not extended its benevolent neutrality to include all
auxiliary uses. In the tax context, for example, government has distinguished
some auxiliary uses from others: Tax laws favorable to religious institutions
may only be applied to their auxiliary uses if the institution can prove that 9the
use is substantially related to its religious, educational or charitable mission.
In the religious land use context, however, no such line has been drawn.
Federal religious land use policy is now primarily governed by the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000.0 RLUIPA,
inter alia, requires a strict scrutiny analysis of certain land use regulations that
impose a substantial burden on "religious exercise. '' l Such land use
regulations may include any "zoning or landmarking law, or the application of
such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land
(including a structure affixed to land)" in which the claimant religious
institution has a present or future property interest. 2 Under RLUIPA, Congress
wanted religious exercise to be broadly construed-"to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of [the statute] and the Constitution."1 3 Accordingly, it
defined religious exercise as "any exercise of religion, whether or not

7. See Muriel L. Whetstone Sims, Potter'sHouse at Primrose, 9 GET READY (2004), availableat

http://www.thepottershouse.org/GRMindex.php (noting that housing prices range from $90,000 to
$400,000).
8. 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970) (holding that a New York statute granting tax exemption to
religious institutions was not a violation of constitutional principles establishing the separation of church
and state). See also Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836 (N.Y. 1956)
(finding that the state, in granting tax exemptions to religious institutions, "had declared a policy that
churches... are more important than local taxes"), aff'd, 174 N.E.2d 743 (N.Y. 1961); State ex. rel.
Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 115 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) (observing
similarly that granting tax exemptions to religious institutions served as "a public recognition of the
importance of these voluntary organizations to the well being of our community life").
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 513(a) (2000).
10. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (Supp. 2003).
11. See § 2000cc(a).
12. § 2000cc-5(5).
13. § 2000cc-3(g).
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compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,"' 14 specifically
including "[t]he use,15building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of
'
religious exercise."
With this definition of "religious exercise," Congress dramatically
expanded the protections offered to religious institutions seeking to build or
physically grow. Importantly, RLUIPA also extended these protections to
religious institutions' auxiliary uses. It did so partly by omission: Congress
declined to differentiate between worship and non-worship uses. It also did so
by writing certain provisions of the law so broadly and so ambiguously that all
non-worship auxiliary uses could conceivably be granted RLUIPA's
protections. RLUIPA now permits any auxiliary enterprise to take advantage of
the same protections afforded to religious institutions regardless of the
relationship of that enterprise to the institution's religious, educational, or
charitable mission.
This change is all the more significant given the trend among religious
institutions to expand the number, size, and scope of auxiliary uses. While
statistics focusing on the auxiliary use phenomenon are not readily available,
one indicator of their increase is the proliferation of large religious institutions.
Such institutions tend to support a wide range of auxiliary uses and must often
push for physical expansion to accommodate them. One type of large religious
institution, the megachurch, defined as a Protestant church with 2000 or more
members, is fast gaining members in part because megachurches typically offer
many non-worship amenities: schools, community centers, dining facilities,
and even movie theaters and gymnasiums. 16 Megachurches seeking to
accommodate new congregants must push for physical expansion. 1 A survey
of 153 megachurches revealed that few respondents felt that their current space
was adequate: nearly half claimed they lacked space for worship,
approximately sixty-five percent said they lacked space for parking and
fellowship, and fully three-quarters claimed they needed more space for
education.18 More and more, megachurches desperate for larger spaces are
achieving their expansionist goals with the help of RLUIPA. And there is every

14. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)
(Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).

15.

§ 2000cc-5(7)(B).

16. Kris Axtman, The Rise of the American Megachurch, CHRISTIAN SC1. MONITOR, Dec. 30, 2003,

at I (noting that in 2003 alone, megachurch attendance may have grown by four percent); Scott
Thumma, Megachurches Today (2001), http://www.hartfordinstitute.org/org/faith-megachurches_

FACTsummary.html (noting that megachurches have seen attendance increase by ninety percent over
the last twenty years).
17. A dramatic example of this push for expansion is Lakewood Church in Houston, Texas. The
30,000-plus congregation moved in July 2005 to the 16,000-seat Compaq Center, formerly home to the
Houston Rockets basketball team. See William Martin, Prime Minister, TEX. MONTHLY, Aug. 2005, at
110.
18. Thumma, supra note 16.
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reason to think they will continue to do so.
Indeed, while it has yet to occur, RLUIPA could potentially be invoked by
megachurches building not just schools, parking, and worship space but nontraditional facilities as well. If a megachurch decided to build a new hospital,
for example, RLUIPA could help the megachurch avoid complying with
zoning codes, city planning goals, historic preservation ordinances, traffic
requirements, and aesthetic regulations-resulting in a greater impact on
neighborhoods and towns than the law's framers might have envisioned. To be
sure, not every religious institution has the means to build hospitals: most of
the nearly 300,000 religious institutions in the United States' 9 remain small,
and half have fewer than one hundred regularly participating adults. 20 Yet by
recognizing RLUIPA's potentially dramatic impact through the megachurch
example, one might better understand why changing the law is so important.
This Note argues that RLUIPA does not adequately address the issue of
auxiliary uses, and that Congress must rework RLUIPA to differentiate
between those auxiliary uses that are substantially related to a religious
institution's mission and those that are not. Congress should explicitly deny
religious protection to uses that are not substantially related to a religious,
educational or charitable mission. By failing to so limit RLUIPA's protections,
Congress would not only be perpetuating bad policy: it could also be
overstepping the benevolent neutrality formulation in cases like Walz and
violating the Establishment Clause.
To set the stage for this discussion, Part I describes free exercise
jurisprudence before RLUIPA and the development of the strict scrutiny test, a
test RLUIPA would eventually adopt. This Part recounts the buildup to
RLUIPA, as Congress and the courts both attempted to shape free exercise
jurisprudence. Finally, the Part takes note of the dearth of case law regarding
auxiliary uses, religious land use, and free exercise.
Part II argues that RLUIPA fails to adequately address the auxiliary use
claims of religious institutions. To support this contention, Part II first
demonstrates how RLUIPA modifies the free exercise case law regarding
religious land use, and describes the stated intent of the law's framers. This
Part then critiques these modifications with respect to auxiliary uses. This Part
finds that RLUIPA's textual ambiguities have made it difficult for courts to
agree upon a uniform standard by which to judge auxiliary use claims. Finally,
this Part identifies a suspicion among courts of RLUIPA claims that attempt to
19. AMERICAN RELIGION DATA ARCHIVE, RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS: FULL U.S. REPORT (2000),
http://www.thearda.com/rcms/2000/usreport2000.html (estimating that there are 268,254 religious
congregations in America, excluding historically black Christian churches).
20. FAITH COMMUNITIES TODAY, A REPORT ON RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY (2000),
http://fact.hartsem.edu/research/fact2000/executivesummary.html (asserting further that "a full quarter
of congregations has fewer than 50 regularly participating adults, while less than 10 percent have more
than 1,000").
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protect auxiliary uses.
Part III more fully discusses two reasons why Congress may want to begin
reworking RLUIPA to better address auxiliary use claims. First, despite what
some courts have done to limit RLUIPA's applicability in the auxiliary use
context, RLUIPA is nonetheless being invoked by religious institutions outside
the court system to free auxiliary uses from complying with land use
regulations. This phenomenon suggests that RLUIPA's ambiguous language
has had the practical effect of granting protection to auxiliary uses. Second, this
Part argues that the Establishment Clause may be violated if RLUIPA is
applied without restriction to all auxiliary uses. While this Note's treatment of
this issue is not exhaustive, it does reveal how Establishment Clause case law
could support fatal constitutional challenges to RLUIPA's land use provisions.
Finally, Part IV offers specific suggestions about how Congress could limit
RLUIPA's applicability in ways that would balance both the right to religious
freedom and the concerns of those who fear the consequences of RLUIPA's
current generosity toward auxiliary uses. This Part recommends adding a
provision in the law to explicitly limit RLUIPA's protections for non-worship
auxiliary uses. This Part concludes by arguing that changes to RLUIPA, as
suggested by this Note, are not inconsistent with the intent of the law's framers.
Such an observation gives substantial weight to the practical feasibility of the
reforms suggested.
I. RELIGIOUS LAND USE LAW BEFORE

RLUIPA

No pre-RLUIPA case squarely addresses the issue of auxiliary uses with
regard to free exercise. Nonetheless, understanding the contours of preRLUIPA jurisprudence in the context of religious land use is essential to
understanding the later treatment of auxiliary uses under RLUIPA. PreRLUIPA free exercise and protected liberty jurisprudence in the Supreme
Court was characterized by heightened or strict scrutiny of governmental
actions that burden a protected freedom. Though the Supreme Court thus
granted considerable protections to religious institutions, the lower courts
tended to be less sympathetic. Indeed, lower courts created new legal burdens
for religious institutions and exhibited a permissive attitude toward regulation.
With its Smith decision in 1990, which granted substantial deference to the
government's interest, the Supreme Court began to move in the same direction
as the lower courts. A critical Congress attempted to reverse this shift in the
Court's free exercise jurisprudence through legislation-a move that would
eventually result in RLUIPA. After describing this interplay between Congress
and the courts, this Part concludes by pointing out the dearth of pre-RLUIPA
free exercise case law addressing auxiliary uses.

Yale Law & Policy Review
A.

Vol. 24:207, 2006

In the Supreme Court

Free exercise case law is rooted in the First Amendment, which has been
made applicable to the states and provides that "Congress shall make no law
... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. 21 The Supreme Court has never
22
considered the question of free exercise in the context of land use law.
However, in elaborating its free exercise and protected liberty jurisprudence,
the Court handed down two cases that pre-RLUIPA lower courts used to
resolve religious land use disputes: Sherbert v. Verner23 and Schad v. Borough
24
of Mount Ephraim.
Sherbert established the strict scrutiny test for free exercise cases, holding
that the First Amendment is offended when government imposes a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion, unless a compelling interest justifies the
burden. 25 The Court held that under this standard, the State of South Carolina
had unconstitutionally denied unemployment benefits to the plaintiff-claimant
26
who refused to work on Saturdays in violation of her religious beliefs. The
State's denial imposed a substantial burden because it forced the claimant to
choose "between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits,
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand. ' ' 27 According to the Court, the State failed to
demonstrate a compelling government interest justifying its imposition of this
substantial burden. 28 The Sherbert Court indicated in dicta that government
must also show that "no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." 29 The Court would later
30
confirm this least restrictive means test to be a component of strict scrutiny.
Schad, which analyzed a land use regulation in the context of free
expression, gave lower courts an alternate ground on which to decide religious
land use cases. The Court in Schad considered the conviction of an operator of
an adult bookstore for violating a zoning ordinance that prohibited all live

21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to
enact" laws prohibiting free exercise of religion).
22. Though it involved a zoning dispute between a church and a municipality, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), did not thoroughly discuss the convergence of free exercise doctrine and

land use laws.
23. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
25. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 407.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 407.

30. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)

("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest.").

RLUIPA and Auxiliary Uses
entertainment. Using heightened scrutiny, the Court stated that "when a zoning
law infringes upon a protected liberty [like free speech], it must be narrowly
drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest." 31 The
Court found that the ordinance violated First Amendment free expression rights
because it was not narrowly drawn and because the Borough had indicated no
substantial government interest in prohibiting live entertainment. 32 As with
Sherbert, the Schad Court articulated, but did not reach, an additional
requirement that courts must "determine whether [demonstrated substantial
government] interests could be served by means that would be less intrusive on
33
activity protected by the First Amendment."
Sherbert and Schad offer a similar two-tiered approach to determine
whether a governmental infringement is unconstitutional. Yet they differ in a
number of ways. On the most basic level, Sherbert addresses free exercise-the
heart of RLUIPA-while Schad addresses free expression. And Schad, but not
Sherbert, involves land use regulations. But more importantly, Sherbert's level
of scrutiny is higher than Schad's for both the claimant and the government:
Sherbert requires that the claimant show a "substantial burden," and that
government show a "compelling" interest, while Schad requires that the
claimant show an "infringement" and requires only a "sufficiently substantial"
interest from government. Despite these differences, lower courts frequently
invoked both Schad and Sherbert to resolve free exercise cases, often ending
up with a hybrid heightened-strict standard.34 Eventually, however, it was
Sherbert's strict scrutiny test that would be codified by RLUIPA.
B.

In the Lower Courts

Following these developments in the Supreme Court's free exercise and
protected liberty jurisprudence, religious institutions began to bring suits
against land use authorities claiming constitutional infringements on their free
exercise. Lower courts used heightened scrutiny, somewhere between Sherbert
and Schad, to resolve these cases. Two observations characterize the lower
court decisions, regardless of the precise level of scrutiny being applied. First,
in determining whether a case involved a free exercise claim, pre-RLUIPA
courts consistently considered the centrality of the religious belief that the
regulation implicated: the closer the belief to the center of the claimant's faith,
the easier he could prove that a free exercise claim, and further a substantial

31.
32.
33.
34.

Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,68 (1981).
Id. at 72.
Id. at 70.
See, e.g., Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1988)

(calling Schad and Sherbert "fluid precedent" and some of "the many evolving standards applicable to
the case"); Islamic Ctr. of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 1988)
(incorporating both Schad and Sherbert, but misconstruing the extent of Schad's scrutiny).
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burden, existed. Second, courts also examined the governmental interest at
stake, heavily weighting government's arguments and often finding its interest
persuasive. As Part II will clarify, RLUIPA would change each of these
characteristics of pre-RLUIPA case law in the context of religious land use,
with significant effects on auxiliary uses.
1.

The Centrality-of-BeliefTest

In the line of cases following Sherbert, the Supreme Court required
religious institutions claiming a substantial burden to show that the government
35
had placed a substantial burden on a "central religious belief or practice."
Accordingly, when resolving claims that a land use regulation imposed a free
exercise burden, pre-RLUIPA lower courts usually considered whether the
alleged burden implicated a belief central to the claimant's faith. Land use
regulations were deemed to have passed heightened scrutiny analysis when the
burden that they placed on a religious claimant was merely incidental,
aesthetic, or economic-especially when
alternative opportunities were
36
conduct.
religious
same
the
for
available
Exemplifying the application of this criterion was Lakewood, Ohio
Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood.3

In

Lakewood, a Jehovah's Witnesses congregation challenged a municipal zoning
ordinance prohibiting the construction of a worship facility on a lot the
congregation had purchased. Observing that "the centrality of the burdened
religious observance to the believer's faith influences the determination of an
infringement, ' 38 the Sixth Circuit found that there was no substantial burden on
the congregation and upheld the ordinance as constitutional. 39 The panel
reasoned:
There is no evidence that the construction of Kingdom Hall is a ritual, a
"fundamental tenet," or a "cardinal principle" of its faith. At most the Congregation
can claim that its freedom to worship is tangentially relatedto worshipping in its
own structure. However, building and owning a church is a desirable accessory
of
40
worship, not a fundamental tenet of the Congregation's religious beliefs.

Because no central belief was implicated, no substantial burden could exist.
The court found that the congregation brought the case primarily to avoid
economic and aesthetic burdens-burdens which did not rise to the level of

35. Hemandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
36. For its part, the Supreme Court has supported this type of analysis. See, e.g., Braunfield v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding as constitutional a Sunday closing law despite the law's
imposition of an economic burden on Orthodox Jewish merchants who could not open their businesses
on Saturdays for religious reasons).
37. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
38. Id. at 306.
39. Id. at 307-09.
40. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
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substantiality. 4 Lakewood has been criticized as "seriously misconstru[ing] the
Sherbert compelling interest test" because it redefined the congregation's
stated religious interest as the "construction of a church in a particular district"
and consequently failed to reach the issue of the government's asserted
interest. 42 Nonetheless, its centrality-of-belief standard was a powerful tool
used by pre-RLUIPA courts to limit the free exercise claims of religious
institutions.
2.

Deference to Government Interest

As Lakewood makes clear, pre-RLUIPA courts were not sympathetic to
claims that governmental regulation burdened the construction and relocation
activities of a religious institution. One common method of dismissing these
claims of religious institutions was finding, as Lakewood did, that such
activities did not implicate a centrally held religious belief. Another common
method, not considered in Lakewood, was finding the governmental interest
sufficient to overcome any alleged burden. Using this method, pre-RLUIPA
decisions like Grosz v. City of Miami Beach44 demonstrated great deference to
the asserted interest of government.
In Grosz, the Eleventh Circuit considered a believer's claim that his faith
was substantially burdened by a municipal zoning provision that prohibited him
from conducting large religious services in his home. Finding the use of a
Sherbert analysis insufficient (in part because of divergent facts), the court
used an "ad hoc balancing test" to weigh the believer's alleged burden against
the government's interest.4 5 Under that nebulous test, the court was convinced
by the government's assertion that enforcing its zoning ordinance "protects the
zones' inhabitants from problems of traffic, noise and litter, avoids spot zoning,
and preserves a coherent land use zoning plan.' 46 The court stated that "the
important objectives underlying zoning and the degree of infringement of those
objectives [that would be] caused by allowing the religious conduct to continue
' 47
place a heavy weight on the government's side of the balancing scale.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the believer's claims, calling them "towards the
41. Id. at 307-08 (stating that "the First Amendment does not require the City to make all land or
even the cheapest or most beautiful land available to churches"). The court went on to analyze the city
ordinance using a due process rational basis test and upheld the ordinance. Id. at 308.
42. Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Use After Boeme, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 873 (2000).
43. See also Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 824-25 (10th Cir. 1988)
(finding no substantial burden on a church where "the record contains no evidence that building a
church or building a church on the particular site is intimately related to the religious tenets of the
church" (emphasis added)).
44. 721 F.2d 729, 739 (11 th Cir. 1983), reh 'g denied, 727 F.2d 1116 (11 th Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 738-740.
46. Id. at 738.
47. Id. at 739.
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lower end of the spectrum" and merely inconvenient, in part because other
nearby locations were available for worship sites. 48 Other pre-RLUIPA courts
adopted Grosz's deference to the governmental interest at stake in religious
land use claims.49
There were exceptions to this deference, but only in cases where the
government's asserted interest was plainly insignificant, or worse, where
government's conduct was plainly unjust. In Islamic Center of Mississippi, Inc.
v. City of Starkville, for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a "more than
incidental, 50 burden was established when a series of zoning decisions made "a
mosque relatively inaccessible within the city limits to Muslims who lack
automobile transportation., 51 That panel found that the city could not show a
compelling government interest because it had failed to enforce the ordinance
against nine Christian churches. 52 The discrimination of the Starkville
municipal officials provided the panel with no reasonable alternative but to rule
in favor of the mosque. Such an outcome, given pre-RLUIPA courts' hostility
to religious institutions' land use claims, remained exceptional.
C.

Smith and the CongressionalResponse

In the decades preceding RLUIPA, and particularly after Sherbert was
decided in 1963, free exercise doctrine was relatively stable. But in 1990, the
Supreme Court decided a case that would spark a chaotic exchange between the
Court and Congress as both institutions attempted to reshape free exercise
doctrine.
The case, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
radically altered the landscape of free exercise jurisprudence by applying
rational basis review to a law affecting religious rights.53 The Court justified its
departure from Sherbert's strict scrutiny by stating: "To make an individual's
obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'-permitting
him, by virtue of his beliefs, to become a law unto himself-contradicts both
constitutional tradition and common sense." 54 The Court acknowledged

48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing Grosz in upholding a city's denial of a use permit to a church to locate in a residential
neighborhood because the city had a strong interest in maintaining the integrity of its zoning scheme,
protecting its residential neighborhoods, and responding to complaints of residents about traffic and

noise).
50. 840 F.2d 293, 302 (5th Cir. 1988).

51.

Id. at 299.

52.
53.
54.

Id. at 302.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 885 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

RLUIPA and Auxiliary Uses
exceptions,5 but otherwise established the rule that government action which

constitutes a neutral law of general applicability and which does not
specifically single out6 a religious belief or practice should be evaluated using
rational basis review.5
The change that Smith brought to free exercise analysis was a surprise to

most observers: it "sent shock waves across the country, especially among faith
communities and those who practiced constitutional law." 57 Many
commentators stressed how Smith subverted well-settled First Amendment
jurisprudence.58 In the decade between Smith and the passage of RLUIPA,
Congress tried to appease those dissatisfied with Smith by reshaping free

exercise doctrine through legislation. Legislators likely took notice of Smith's
statement that state legislatures and the political process should weigh the
protection of religious practices against the interests of the state. As the Court

put it, the "unavoidable consequence[s] of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs."59

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 199360 was Congress's
first "unsubtle attempt" to undo the Smith decision and to impose Sherbert's
strict scrutiny on all laws that substantially burden religious exercise. 6 1 RFRA

55. See id. at 881 (granting an exception if the law implicated a hybrid right-both the Free
Exercise Clause and another constitutional right); id. at 884 (stating that "where the State has in place a
system of individual exemptions" and not generally applicable laws, it must have a "compelling reason"
for doing so); id. at 886 n.3 (noting that strict scrutiny would still apply if a law were facially nonneutral).
56. Id.at878-81.
57. Timothy J. Houseal, RLUIPA: ProtectingHouses of Worship and Religious Liberty, 20 DEL.
LAW. 28, 29 (2002).
58. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the
Public/PrivateDistinction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (1994) (defending Smith but noting that "the
Smith Court did more to underscore the disarray... than it did to resolve [it]"); Ira C. Lupu,
Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259,
260 (1993) (claiming that Smith was "substantively wrong and institutionally irresponsible"); Michael
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111
(1990) (charging that "Smith is contrary to the deep logic of the First Amendment"). But see William P.
Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (defending
Smith against McConnell's critique).
59. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; cf McConnell, supranote 58, at 1129:
The rhetoric of this sentence is certainly impolitic, leaving the Court open to the charge of
abandoning its traditional role as protector of minority rights against majoritarian oppression.
The "disadvantaging" of minority religions is not 'unavoidable' if the courts are doing their
job. Avoiding certain 'consequences' of democratic government is ordinarily thought to be the
very purpose of a Bill of Rights. But the argument reflected in this sentence nonetheless
contains ideas that cannot be dismissed so lightly.
Id.
60. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(107 Stat.) 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)), partially invalidatedby City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
61. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious
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mandated that strict scrutiny be applied to any government action involving a
substantial burden on religious exercise: "Government may substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of
the burden to the person--(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest." 62 With this language, which closely tracks Sherbert's,
it is not surprising that the land use cases decided under RFRA largely
followed pre-RLUIPA decisions. 63 But these cases were few in number, as
RFRA only remained intact for three-and-a-half-years. In City of Boerne v.
Flores, and despite its encouragement in Smith for Congressional action, the
Court invalidated RFRA as applied to the states, finding it an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress's Enforcement Clause powers because Congress had not
shown a pattern of religious discrimination meriting such a far-reaching
remedy and because RFRA violated separation-of-powers principles. 64
After the Boerne decision, Congress considered the Religious Liberty
Protection Act (RLPA) bills of 199865 and 1999,66 which attempted to impose a
strict scrutiny test on government action burdening religious land use. These
proposed laws, which were criticized as too broad and having the same defects
as RFRA, were never passed. However, two groups-dedicated to restoring the
land use and prison rights components of RFRA, respectively-emerged
67
undeterred from the RLPA process and combined forces to produce RLUIPA.
D. A Dearth of Free Exercise Claims RegardingAuxiliary Uses
A final observation, relevant for this Note's discussion of RLUIPA in Part
II, is that pre-RLUIPA free exercise cases like Lakewood, Grosz, and Islamic
Center dealt with facilities used primarily for worship purposes. Few preRLUIPA free exercise cases involved facilities with both worship and auxiliary
Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersonsAct, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 323 (2003).
62. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2000).
63. Compare, e.g., Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554,
1558 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (using a Grosz analysis to hold that where there are other alternatives for a
homeless shelter to locate, the burden is "at the lower end of the spectrum" and not entitled to free
exercise protection), and W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 54445 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the enforcement of zoning regulations prohibiting a church from feeding
homeless persons on its premises substantially burdened free exercise of religion because ministering to
the needy could be considered a religious activity), with St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City
of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935, (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (finding a city ordinance unconstitutional
for denying a permit to a homeless shelter where the shelter constituted free exercise of religion
protected by the First Amendment). See also Int'l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of Chicago
Heights, 955 F. Supp. 878, 880 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (recognizing that RFRA "takes us back pre-Smith" and
concluding that additional expense, "so long as it is not an [unusual] inflated expense ... is not a
substantial burden").
64. 521 U.S. 507, 529-36 (1997).
65. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998).
66. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
67. See Hamilton, supra note 61, at 334.
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uses, and no case considers or squarely addresses a facility with solely
auxiliary uses. 6 8 One Tenth Circuit case considered the free exercise concerns
of a church seeking to build a multi-use facility that included worship space,
administrative offices, classrooms, a gym, parking, and a drive-in
amphitheater. 69 The church proposing to build this facility had been denied a
special use permit to begin construction in an agricultural zone that excluded
religious uses. The court held that the ordinance was valid because the burden
on the church was "indirect" and "financial" in nature, and therefore did not
amount to the infringement of religious freedom.7 ° Unfortunately for our
purposes, neither the existence nor the nature of these auxiliary uses was
considered in the court's ruling.
When land use disputes involving auxiliary uses did arise, religious
institutions rarely sought to resolve them by claiming free exercise
infringements. Instead, pre-RLUIPA courts considered the nature of the
relationship of the enterprise to a religious institution in the context of the local
land use ordinances. Specifically, courts asked whether an enterprise could be
considered an "accessory use" as defined by a relevant zoning code. Often the
code would define an accessory use as customary, "anticipated incidental or
secondary uses that are either necessary or convenient for the property
owner." 71 As the Indiana Supreme Court put it, describing that State's law:
"facilities that go with the church of the particular denomination may not be
excluded if the church is admittable. 7 2 If an enterprise was determined to be an
accessory use to a religious institution, it would be given rights and restrictions
derived from the rights and restrictions on the institution itself-that is, it
would be subject to, or free from, the same land use regulations as its parent
institution. Accessory uses were not prohibited solely because they resulted in
an adverse effect on property values,
loss of tax revenue, or decreased
73
enjoyment of neighborhood property.
While a full treatment of this body of case law is outside the scope of this
Note, suffice it to say that courts varied widely in their approach because the
issues and the underlying land use regulations were highly localized. Some
jurisdictions were permissive in determining accessory uses; others were not.74
68.
69.
70.
71.

The author found no such cases in several searches.
Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 822 (10th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 825.
Helen M. Maher, Religious Freedom and Zoning, 5 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 326 (1998)

(quoting DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.14 (3d ed. 1993)).

72. Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 172 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ind. 1961) (finding that a Catholic
church was wrongly denied permission to build a church facility, school, priests' dwelling, and sisters'
home because such uses were accessory uses) (emphasis added).
73. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
City of Idaho Falls, 448 P.2d 185, 188 (Idaho 1968).
74. Compare,e.g., City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist Church, 382 A.2d 377, 379-80 (N.H.
1978) (defining a "facilit[y] usually connected with a church" under a Concord ordinance as one in
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No nationwide case law emerged-or indeed, could emerge-regarding the
disposition of religious land use cases involving auxiliary uses. This fractured
body of case law was not troubling when few religious institutions offered
76
auxiliary uses. 75 But the rise of auxiliary uses begs a unified approach.

As the preceding discussion reveals, a nationwide approach-at least for
primary worship facilities-was emerging with the development of protected
liberty case law. Pre-RLUIPA courts used two commingling standards--Schad
and Sherbert-to address land-use claims involving a religious institution's
primary worship facility. Greater federalization of religious land use claims
would come to extend to auxiliary uses with the passage of RLUIPA.
II. RLUIPA

AND AUXILIARY USES

With the exception of the approximately six years when Smith was the
controlling precedent, courts used heightened scrutiny as defined by the
Supreme Court's free exercise and protected liberty cases to determine whether
a challenged land use regulation was constitutional.7 7 RLUIPA's drafters
insisted that they were not changing this jurisprudence with their passage of the
new law.78 However, RLUIPA has significantly departed from prior law by
expanding the class of protected religious uses to all auxiliary uses, including
those that are not substantially related to a religious institution's religious,
educational or charitable mission. The law has done so both by offering a
broader, statutory definition of "religious exercise" and by failing to exclude
tangential auxiliary uses from receiving its protections. RLUIPA has also
created confusion in the courts by first eliminating the centrality-of-belief
standard of pre-RLUIPA jurisprudence and declining to specify another one in
its place, and second, by failing to define a substantial burden. Courts have
recognized the difficulties of these ambiguities for cases involving auxiliary
uses. Wary of over-inclusion, and perhaps heeding indications from the law's
framers that RLUIPA be limited in scope, 79 some courts have indicated a
growing reluctance to favor religious institutions.
"close association" with the church and holding that a religious school is a connected use of a church
when congregants' religious beliefs require that their children receive a religious education), with
Damascus Cmty. Church v. Clackamas County, 610 P.2d 273, 275-76 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (ruling that
full-time parochial school was not an ancillary use "usually" connected with a church as was required by
statute to evade special permit requirement).
75. Before RLUIPA, auxiliary uses certainly existed-like the "school; meeting room;
kindergarten, small games, open field and hard-top play areas, and parking lot" considered in a 1956
land use claim brought by a church. See, e.g., Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 136
N.E.2d 827, 830, 837 (N.Y. 1956) (finding "arbitrary and unreasonable" a zoning board's denial of a
church's application to build these structures).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
77. This "six years" figure includes 1990-1993 (after Smith but before RFRA), and 1997-2000
(after Boerne but before RLUIPA).
78. See infra text accompanying note 94.
79. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
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This Part aims to clarify the ways in which RLUIPA affects free exercise
claims involving auxiliary uses. The first Section describes the passage and
codification of RLUIPA and notes the framers' intent with regard to auxiliary
uses. The second Section analyzes RLUIPA's departure from the pre-RLUIPA
jurisprudence described in Part I, emphasizing the impact of these departures
on auxiliary use claims. The third Section chronicles the courts' response to
these ambiguities in RLUIPA and their growing concern over the inclusion of
auxiliary uses.
A. The Passageand Codification ofRL UIPA
1.

RLUIPA 's CentralProvisions

With RLUIPA, Congress attempted to avoid the constitutional defects of
RFRA, both by narrowing the scope of the law to the land use 8 0 and
institutional 8 (primarily prison) contexts and by developing a legislative record
that found a history of discrimination in land use practice. s 2 It concluded that
this discrimination justified RLUIPA's prophylactic rules to "simplify 83the
enforcement of constitutional standards in land use regulation of churches."
In many ways, RLUIPA simply codified existing case law. It enshrined the
Sherbert strict scrutiny / least restrictive means test in its first section:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a
religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the84least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.

This test applies in three contexts: (1) when the burden is imposed in a
federally funded program or activity, even if the burden results from a
generally applicable law; (2) where the burden affects, or the removal of that
burden would affect, interstate commerce, even if the burden results from a
generally applicable law; and (3) where the burden is imposed in the process of

80. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc5 (Supp. 2003).
81. § 2000cc-1.
82. See Houseal, supra note 57, at 30 (chronicling Congress's efforts, including holding six House
Subcommittee hearings and three Senate Committee hearings, taking expert testimony, and analyzing

several studies).
83. 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Senator Orrin Hatch
and Senator Edward Kennedy). Legislators were particularly worried about black churches, Jewish
synagogues, and "new, small, or unfamiliar churches." Id. at S7774. See also id. at S7778 (July 27,
2000) (statement of Senator Harry Reid) (emphasizing the Mormon Church's "serious reservations"
about land use regulations that are applied in a discriminatory fashion).
84. § 2000cc(a)(l).
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implementing an individualized land use regulation. 85 In articulating the first
two contexts, the drafters simply restated existing restrictions on Congress's
Spending and Commerce Powers, while the third adopted one of the exceptions
carved out by Smith.86 RLUIPA also codified prior case law in its
discrimination and exclusion clause, prohibiting a government from imposing a
land use regulation that treats a religious institution on "less than equal
,87
8
terms," discriminates against an institution on the basis of religion,88
or
"totally excludes ... or unreasonably limits" religious institutions from
locating in a jurisdiction. 89 RLUIPA thus protects religious exercise from land
use regulations in three independent ways-protecting against substantial
burdens, discrimination, and exclusion.
RLUIPA did not adopt prior case law wholesale: it created a new term,
"religious exercise," 9° which had never been used in free exercise
jurisprudence. 91 This term specifically encompassed exercises of religion
compelled by non-central religious beliefs92 as well as "[t]he use, building, or
conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise."93 Oddly,
senators commenting on the Congressional Record proclaimed that RLUIPA's
strict scrutiny formulation was "not intended to be given any broader
interpretation than the Supreme Court's articulation of the concept of
substantial burden [on] religious exercise." 94 Such a proclamation was belied

85.
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)
(Supp.2003).
86. This was Smith's so-called individualized assessments exception. See supra note 55.
87. § 2000cc(b)(1). Prior cases codified by this provision include Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. of
San Francisco v. City of Piedmont, 289 P.2d 438 (Cal. 1955) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that
limited private and religious schools, but not public schools, in residential areas); City of Miami Beach
v. State ex rel. Lear, 175 So. 537, 539 (Fla. 1937) (invalidating as "arbitrary and unreasonable" an
ordinance that limited private and religious schools, but not public schools, in a residential area); and
Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 136 N.E.2d 827, 834 (N.Y. 1956) (stating that "[aln
ordinance will also be stricken if it attempts to exclude private or parochial schools from any residential
area where public schools are permitted"), aff'd, 174 N.E.2d 743 (N.Y. 1961).
88. § 2000cc(b)(2). Prior cases codified by this provision include Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S.
67, 70 (1953) (reversing the conviction of a minister who had given a sermon in a park where other
religious groups had freely operated because "[t]o call the words which one minister speaks to his
congregation a sermon, immune from regulation, and the words of another minister an address, subject
to regulation, is merely an indirect way of preferring one religion over another").
89. § 2000cc(b)(3). Prior cases codified by this provision include Ellsworth v. Gercke, 156 P.2d
242 (Ariz. 1945) (striking down as arbitrary and unreasonable a city ordinance excluding churches from
residential districts, but allowing other nonresidential uses); O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 105 N.E.2d 917
(Ill. App. Ct. 1952) (upholding a city council's decision to allow a church to build in a residential area);
and Diocese of Rochester, 136 N.E.2d at 834 (espousing the majority view that "[ilt is well established
in this country that a zoning ordinance may not wholly exclude a church or synagogue from any
residential district").
90. See § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
91. See supra text accompanying notes I I and 14.
92. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)
(Supp.2003).
93. § 2000cc-5(7)(B).
94. See supra note 83, at S7776.
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by the unique religious exercise definition codified in the statute. As this puzzle
and the following discussion reveal, the final form of RLUIPA did not always
reflect its framers' stated intent.
2.

The Framers'IntentRegardingAuxiliary Uses

The central provisions of RLUIPA demonstrate that Congress had many
goals in passing the law: to remedy perceived discrimination, to eliminate
substantial burdens on religious exercise, and to reinforce certain aspects of
free exercise case law. But the statute does not fully reveal how Congress
thought that the central issue considered by this Note-auxiliary uses-should
be addressed. To discern the intent of the law's framers with regard to auxiliary
uses, one must look beyond the text of RLUIPA.
The starting point for this analysis is the substantial evidence that Congress
intended for the law to apply broadly. The text of the statute specifies a
construction that is "to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the
statute] and the Constitution." 95 The bill's co-sponsors, Senators Hatch and
Kennedy, issued a joint statement that explained the rationale for such a broad
construction:
The right to assemble for worship is at the very core of the free exercise of religion.
Churches and synagogues cannot function without a physical space adequate to
their needs and consistent with their theological requirements. The right to build,
buy, or rent such a space is an indispensable adjunct of the core First Amendment
right to assemble for religious purposes.

With this statement, and despite their call that the law should be broadly
applied, the law's framers could be seen to suggest two possible limitations: (1)
to spaces in which the "right to assemble for worship" could be exercised, and
(2) to spaces "consistent with [religious institutions'] theological
requirements." Neither of these seemingly sensible limitations was codified in
RLUIPA. RLUIPA does not mandate that its protections be limited to worship
spaces. Nor does RLUIPA incorporate a "consistent with their theological
requirements" standard-a standard that sounds similar to the centrality-ofbelief standard used in pre-RLUIPA cases.
Nonetheless, RLUIPA never indicates by its terms that the law is limitless
97
or that religious entities should be entirely exempt from land use regulations.
The drafters themselves declared that the law "does not provide religious
institutions with immunity from land use regulation." 98 Such rhetoric was not
inconsistent with the drafters' intent that the law apply broadly; it does
95. § 2000cc-3(g).
96. See supra note 83, at S7774.
97. Cf Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 2003),
(stating that "no such free pass for religious land uses masquerades among the legitimate protections
RLUIPA affords to religious exercise").
98. See supra note 83, at S7776.
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demonstrate, however, that this breadth should have limits. Indeed, Senators
Hatch and Kennedy directly addressed the question of excluding certain
auxiliary uses from RLUIPA's protections, emphasizing that:
[N]ot every activity carried out by a religious entity or individual constitutes
"religious exercise." In many cases, real property is used by religious institutions
for purposes that are comparable to those carried out by other institutions. While
recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, sponsored or operated
by a religious institution, or may permit a religious institution to obtain additional
funds to further its religious activities, this alone does not automatically bring these
activities or facilities within the bill's definition [on] "religious exercise." For
example, a burden on a commercial building, which is connected to religious
exercise primarily by the fact that the proceeds from the building's operation would
be used to support religious exercise, is not a substantial burden on "religious
exercise."

Thus the bill's most ardent supporters asserted that some auxiliary usesthose with a less direct relationship to religious exercise-should not trigger
strict scrutiny under RLUIPA. However, they recognized the absurdity of
offering RLUIPA's protections to enterprises that are essentially commercial,
and not religious, in nature.
In the end, Congress failed to codify any limitations on auxiliary uses in the
language of the statute itself. Without being passed into law, the words of
Senators Hatch and Kennedy have no legal force. They do, however, indicate
that Congress knew about, but declined to address, the issue of auxiliary uses.
As the next Section will explain, Congress's choice opened the door for
religious institutions to make claims that were, practically speaking, impossible
100
before RLUIPA: free exercise claims involving auxiliary uses.
B.

RLUIPA's FailureTo Address Auxiliary Use Claims

Contrary to its drafters' stated intent, RLUIPA does not prevent the law's
protections from extending to a religious institution's auxiliary uses. Firstly,
Congress gave no indication in the statute of how auxiliary uses should be
treated, never differentiating between worship and non-worship uses and never
mentioning auxiliary uses in the text. Moreover, Congress both failed to
provide standards by which to judge auxiliary use claims and failed to define
"substantial burden" in a way that would bring clarity to legal disputes
invoking RLUIPA. As to Congress's first failure, one possibility for judging
such claims could have been the pre-RLUIPA centrality-of-belief standard that
considered, as a threshold matter, whether the free exercise allegedly
implicated was central to a claimant's faith. Congress could have provided that
auxiliary uses in particular should be subject to such analysis. Instead,
Congress eliminated the centrality-of-belief standard altogether and offered no
99. Id.
100. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
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replacement. Most courts have since formulated a much lower sincerely-held
belief standard to take its place. That shift has also signaled the decline of
deference to government interest. Having eliminated the centrality-of-belief
standard, Congress alternatively might have defined a standard for establishing
a demanding definition for a substantial burden. However, Congress again
failed to clarify RLUIPA's scope by declining to define substantial burden at
all. The absence of a uniform standard resulted in a circuit split over how to
determine whether a substantial burden has been imposed.
1.

Centrality-of-BeliefStandardv. Sincerely-HeldBeliefStandard

RLUIPA eliminated the centrality-of-belief standard that helped preRLUIPA courts to determine, as a threshold matter, when free exercise was
implicated. Instead, the law defines "religious exercise" to include "any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of

religious belief.'' ° RLUIPA thus renders obsolete the reasoning in preRLUIPA cases-among them the Lakewood decision-that considered whether
the construction of a religious structure is centrally related (as opposed to
"tangentially related") to the religious institution's religious beliefs. 102 Instead
of focusing on the relationship between religious beliefs and religious exercise,
courts must now determine whether an act constitutes religious exercise. Some
commentators have pointed out that "RLUIPA's definition avoids the Sixth
Circuit's conundrums [in Lakewood] over whether construction
of a church
10 3
building is only 'tangentially related' to religious worship."
The departure from the centrality-of-belief standard, however, has left more
conundrums in its place. Most courts have said that although the religious
practice need not be central, the substantial burden "must be based on a
sincerely held religious belief."'10 4 The notion of sincerity has some history in
Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court
ruled that a compulsory education regulation was not enforceable on a religious
group in part because the group's claimants had demonstrated "the sincerity of
their religious beliefs." °5 The Court, however, did not rest solely on the fact
101.
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)
(Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).

102. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d
303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820 (10th

Cir. 1988).
103. Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to UnconstitutionalZoning Practices,9 GEO. MASON

L. REv. 929, 959 (2001).
104. Shepherd Montessori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 675 N.W.2d 271, 281 (Mich.
App. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). See also Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F.
Supp. 2d 691, 700 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d
1214, 1225 (11 th Cir. 2004)).
105. 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).
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that the claimants had proved their sincerity. It also relied upon "the
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and
daily conduct play in the continued survival of... their religious organization,
and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally
valid as to others."' 0 6 In other words, the Court's holding in Yoder relied in its
holding on its determination that the particular belief being implicated was
central to the claimants' faith.
Without the additional requirement of centrality, then, the sincerely-held
belief standard now being applied by courts under RLUIPA is low. A
Connecticut federal district court, for instance, granted a preliminary injunction
where a town had issued a cease-and-desist order and had denied a special use
permit for weekly prayer group meetings. 107 These meetings often involved
fifty to sixty people, lasted several hours each week, and resulted in traffic and
safety problems.' 0 8 Asserting that the conditions his prayer meetings imposed
on neighbors were minimal, the owner of the house where the group met
claimed that the meetings were "an important part of his faith" and "brought
him closer to God" such that enforcement of the cease and desist order would
impede his ability to practice his beliefs.' 0 9 The court held that because the
homeowner was sincere, he had a free exercise claim, and further found that his
free exercise was unconstitutionally burdened by the town's actions. Under the
sincerely-held belief standard, the homeowner's ability to demonstrate that free
exercise was implicated rested on the relatively low burden of proving the
sincerity of his beliefs.
Eventually, the logic of the Connecticut court will be tested by courts
considering auxiliary use claims. When this occurs, religious institutions may
succeed in a claim that an accessory use constitutes religious exercise under
RLUIPA so long as they can demonstrate sincerity. Establishing that an
accessory use meets this relatively low threshold is the critical step in showing
that an institution's free exercise is implicated. Unlike the centrality-of-belief
standard, the sincerely-held belief standard does not consider whether the use is
actually related to a central tenet of the institution's faith. Such a low standard
may lead to the over-inclusion of accessory uses in that it may protect
accessory uses that only minimally relate to the religious institution's religious,
educational or charitable mission. Under the sincerely-held belief standard, the
era of deference to the government interest is over.

106. Id.

107. Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n of New Milford, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 187-88 (D. Conn. 2001),
vacated and remandedfor dismissal, 402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005).

108. Id. at 176.
109. Id. at 176-77. See also Dilaura v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 30 F. App'x 501, 509 (6th Cir.
2002) (per curiam) (adopting Murphy and holding that "gatherings of individuals for the purposes of
prayer.., is a use of land constituting a religious exercise that is substantially burdened, under the
RLUIPA, by a zoning ordinance that prevents such gatherings").
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2.

Variations on the SubstantialBurden Theme

In addition to its failure to provide a standard with regard to establishing a
religious exercise claim, RLUIPA never defines substantial burden. The
framers of the law had hoped that the courts would interpret this absence to
mean that substantial burden analysis would be similar to that of pre-RLUIPA
courts. 110 However, courts have split over the articulation of the substantial
burden standard. Competing views have been articulated by the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits.
In a case commonly known as the C.L. U.B. case, the Seventh Circuit held
that:
[I]n the context of RLUIPA's broad definition of religious exercise, a land-use
regulation that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is one that

necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering
religious exercise-including the use of real property for the purpose thereof within

the regulated jurisdiction generally-effectively impracticable.

The C.L. U.B. court went on to emphasize that the burdens of meeting
procedural requirements in a zoning application process, accommodating for
land scarcity, dealing with political aspects of the approval process, and/or
bearing financial costs as a result of less-than-favorable zoning provisions were
not substantial under RLUIPA because they did not render impracticable the
use of real property for the purpose of religious exercise. 112 The Third and
Ninth Circuits have adopted this definition of substantial burden, as have
13
several other courts.1
Like the pre-RLUIPA centrality-of-belief standard for determining a free
exercise claim, C.L. U.B. 's effectively impracticable standard for determining a
substantial burden establishes a high bar for claimants to show the
substantiality of their burden. Though C.L. U.B. dealt with a worship facility, its

110. See supra text accompanying note 94.
111. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago (C.L. UB), 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir.
2003) (emphasis added) (finding no RLUIPA substantial burden in a city's ordinance requiring special
use approval to operate in commercial or business areas and limiting operation in manufacturing areas),
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1096 (2004).
112. Id.
113. See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 100 F. App'x 70, 77 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citing C.L. U.B. 's definition of substantial burden and finding that the religious institution did
not establish a likelihood of success in establishing a substantial burden); San Jose Christian Coll. v.
City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the grant of summary judgment for
the city on the college's RLUIPA claim); Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, No. 03-C1936, 2003 WL 22048089, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2003) (holding under CL.UB. that no substantial
burden was imposed by zoning ordinances, even though the church "has undoubtedly suffered serious
hardships, first in its attempt to find a suitable property, and, once it found one... in attempting to win
approval for the intended uses" (quoting Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of
Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2003))). See also, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of W. Linn, 86 P.3d 1140, 1157 (Or. Ct. App.
2004) (finding that "neither the building of a new church (and the concomitant expansion of the church
community) nor, in the meantime, the ability of current members to reasonably conveniently engage in
worship has been rendered 'effectively impracticable'), aff'd, 111 P.3d 1123 (Or. 2005).
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implications for non-worship auxiliary use claims are relatively clear. An
alleged burden on auxiliary uses must be shown to bear a direct, primary, and
fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise effectively
impracticable. Under C.L. U.B., an auxiliary use that only tangentially relates to
a religious institution's mission would not likely receive the protections of
RLUIPA.
The Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, has said that the Seventh Circuit's
definition would render parts of RLUIPA "meaningless" and accordingly has
offered a new analysis: "a 'substantial burden' is akin to significant pressure
which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior
accordingly."' 1 4 This formulation implies that an obstacle incident to the
regulation of land use-so long as it coerced a change in conduct-could be
found to be substantial. Compared with the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit formulation sets a lower burden for the religious institution claiming
that it has suffered a burden on its religious exercise because of restrictions on
its auxiliary enterprise. Under the Eleventh Circuit rule, such an institution is
not required to demonstrate that the challenged restrictions rendered religious
exercise impracticable. It must merely show that these restrictions directly
affected the behavior of adherents. Other courts have found this lower burden
5
to be an attractive alternative to the Seventh Circuit rule."
The debate between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits highlights the
effects of RLUIPA's ambiguities and omissions. Without the clarity of a
uniform rule, courts have had a difficult time establishing standards by which
to judge whether a religious belief has been implicated or whether a substantial
burden has been established.
C. A Suspicion ofExtending RLUIPA to Auxiliary Uses
Even without consistent statutory standards, courts have generally
construed RLUIPA in favor of religious institutions. Courts have not, however,
dealt with auxiliary uses with the same permissiveness as they have dealt with
facilities used primarily for worship. Several of the courts that have considered
whether RLUIPA protects auxiliary uses have rightly demonstrated a
reluctance to grant these uses RLUIPA's full protections.
The court in Castle Hills FirstBaptist Church v. City of Castle Hills limited
RLUIPA's applicability to exclude a common auxiliary use: parking. 1 6 There,
the court acknowledged that the large religious institution had overcome the

114. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004).

115. See, e.g., Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (restating the Eleventh Circuit
formulation and emphasizing that "a government action or regulation creates a 'substantial burden' on a
religious exercise if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and
significantly violate his religious beliefs") (emphases added).
116. No. SA-01-CA-1149-RF, 2004 WL 546792, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004).
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sincerely-held belief threshold and thus that its desire to build a parking lot
involved "genuine and compelling religious convictions require it to increase
'
its own membership and encourage new members to join the congregation. 117
Nonetheless, the court found that the city's ruling with respect to Castle Hills'
parking lot did not constitute a substantial burden on free exercise warranting
strict scrutiny review under RLUIPA, 118 in part because applying RLUIPA in
that situation would allow the church to demand "whatever amount [of
parking] the church desires."'1 19 The court also recognized the city's interest in
regulating land to assure a uniform architectural character.1 20 The court thus
recognized that interpreting RLUIPA too broadly-to include such uses as
parking-could have negative consequences.
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Westchester Day School v. Village of
Mamaroneck considered a case in which a district court granted summary
judgment to a religious day school that had been denied a permit to build
additional facilities on its campus.' 2 1 The court remanded the case, finding that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the school could show
a substantial burden resulting from the denial.122 In dicta, the circuit panel
criticized the district court's interpretation of RLUIPA, 123 explaining that it
would render "any improvement or enlargement proposed by a religious school
to its secular educational and accessory facilities ... immune from regulation
or rejection by a zoning board so long as the proposed improvement would
enhance the overall experience of the students."'' 24 Under such logic, the panel
went on, "a serious question arises whether it goes beyond the proper function
of protecting the free exercise of religion into the constitutionally
impermissible zone of entwining government with religion in a manner that
prefers religion over irreligion and confers special benefits on it."' 1 5 With this
dicta, the Second Circuit has gone farther than any other court in assessing the
problems of applying RLUIPA too generously.
Using the Westchester Day School dicta, a New York federal district court
recently declined to extend RLUIPA's protection to include a church's
126
expansion that mainly involved the building out of administrative offices.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at *11.
Seeid. at*12-*13.
Id.at *12.
Seeid. at*13.
386 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004), vacating on other grounds 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

122. See id. at 185 (stating that "[lt]he Application provided for the addition of eighty-one parking
spaces. In summary, a portion of the facilities to be built or modified... were intended specifically for
religious exercises, while the major part of the plan involved secular facilities, such as classrooms,

rooms for computerls] and art, smaller rooms for tutoring, a cafeteria, and administrative offices").
123. Id.

124. Idat 189.
125. Id. at 190.
126. See Cathedral Church of the Intercessor v. Inc. vill. of Malveme, 353 F. Supp. 2d 375, 380
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The church had submitted one application for a building permit for its
expansion, but was denied. The village later accepted a revised version of the
church's application. 127 The church subsequently sued the village under
RLUIPA, "contend[ing] it was 'compelled' to submit revised plans" and that
28
after the permit was granted it was subject to harassment from city officials.
However, the court dismissed the suit, finding that there was no substantial
burden and reasoning that "[s]imply because the Church is a religious
institution does not mean it receives an unencumbered right to zoning approval
for non-religious uses."' 2 9 This language indicates a suspicion-a suspicion
shared by other courts--of extending RLUIPA to cover non-worship uses.
Of course, these cases involved rather ordinary auxiliary uses-parking,
school facilities, and administrative offices. Though no cases involving
extraordinary auxiliary uses have come to the courts, courts' restraints on
ordinary auxiliary uses indicate early apprehension about overextending
RLUIPA's protections.
III. WHY RLUIPA

SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO BETTER ADDRESS AUXILIARY
USE CLAIMS

The analysis in Part II revealed several reasons why Congress must clarify
RLUIPA: the divergence between the written law and the framer's stated
intent, Congress's failure to address auxiliary uses, and courts' difficulties
applying the law. This Part focuses on two additional reasons. The first reason
is that religious institutions have begun trying to enforce RLUIPA outside of
the court system in a way that favors their auxiliary uses. The likelihood that
religious institutions will win on RLUIPA claims in court has unexpectedly
empowered religious institutions outside the courtroom. They have found that,
by threatening to file a costly and time-consuming RLUIPA suit, they can
pressure land use authorities into complying with their demands. As a result,
religious institutions bargaining in the shadow of RLUIPA are beginning to
become a "law unto themselves"-the very problem the Smith Court tried to
prevent. 30 The second reason is that failing to limit the law's applicability may
render the law as applied to be an unconstitutional violation of the
Establishment Clause in that it may favor religion over irreligion. Combined,
these two reasons provide a compelling rationale for the reforms called for in
Part IV.

(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
127. See id.
128. Id.at380-81.
129. Id. at 390-91.
130. See text accompanying note 54.
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A. A Law Unto Themselves: Invoking RLUIPA Outside the Court System
Despite some courts' efforts to limit RLUIPA's applicability in auxiliary
use cases, RLUIPA is nonetheless working to protect auxiliary uses-outside
the court system. After more than five years of RLUIPA litigation,' 3' religious
institutions have realized that land use authorities are extremely vulnerable to
the threat of litigation: local governments worry about the time, expense, and
social cost of litigating against a well-funded or well-respected religious
institution. Accordingly, religious institutions, particularly larger ones with
multiple auxiliary uses, have found a way to take advantage of the broad
protections of RLUIPA before resorting to court action. Instead of waiting for a
land use dispute to become litigious, they immediately invoke RLUIPA at the
first stage of the dispute. This practice, which has been chronicled only rarely
but is sure to increase in frequency, demonstrates that courts alone cannot
control the applicability of RLUIPA.
In those cases that have become public, local governments have shown a
tendency to acquiesce to the threat of a RLUIPA-based challenge rather than
take on the religious institution that issued it. Denver's 2000-member
Greenwood Community Church, for example, threatened to file suit under
RLUIPA after its application to amend an existing special use permit was
denied. 132 The congregation, already big enough to operate a day care center,
wanted to double the size of its main building by expanding the sanctuary and
adding a chapel, music room, and community area, as well as 250 parking
spaces. 133 After the church's threat, the city officials reversed their decision.
This reversal effectively allowed the church to move ahead in building
a court following Castle Hills might
auxiliary uses-including parking-where
34
restricted.'
building
such
have found
Similarly, the planning board of Rockaway Township, New Jersey,
considered whether the 5000-member Christ Church was so large that it fell
outside Rockaway's traditional definition of a church, and would therefore
require additional permits from the zoning board before relocating.' 35 The
church was proposing to build several new buildings on a former office site
encompassing 107 acres, including a sanctuary seating 2152 people, a private
school, parking lot, and various recreational facilities.136 When the church

131. RLUIPA was signed into law on September 22, 2000.
132. See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Greenwood Community Church v. City of Greenwood
Village, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/55.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2005).
133. See Joan Lowy, Megachurches,CINCINNATI POST, Sept. 8, 2003, at IF.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 116-119.
135. John Chadwick, Law Creates Pulpit Bullies, Critics Say, BERGEN RECORD (N.J.), Sept. 5,
2004, at AI.
136. See Rob Jennings, Rockaway Pastor: OK Christ Church, DAILY RECORD (Morris County,
N.J.), Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://www.dailyrecord.com/news/articles/news2-churchletter.htm. A
group opposing Christ Church's efforts has stated that a review of the site plans indicates an intent to
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threatened a RLUIPA suit, the planning board temporarily dropped its plans to
limit the church. 137 However, when the board went so far as to pass new zoning
ordinances affecting Christ Church's submitted site plans, Christ Church
its RLUIPA lawsuit to claim further religious exercise
responded by amending
38
1
infringements.
The recent public disputes involving Greenwood Community Church and
Christ Church illustrate the power of RLUIPA outside the courts to shelter
auxiliary uses from land use regulations-a power sure to be harnessed by
more and more religious institutions. Rather than evaluate the application of a
land use regulation using post-RLUIPA free exercise framework, land use
authorities are beginning to use only one criterion: whether an entity is a
religious institution. Religious institutions, they reason, will have the powerful
protection of RLUIPA in court-a protection that may ultimately cause the
land use authorities to lose. Instead of wasting money and time litigating, land
use authorities give in to religious institutions' threats. Land use authorities
may benefit in the short term by avoiding the costs of litigation. But in the long
term, RLUIPA's reach will expand to the point where some religious
institutions, including their auxiliary uses, are effectively dictating their own
land use regulations. Even the law's framers, who may have wanted RLUIPA
to fortify religious institutions' bargaining power, would not have predicted
such an outcome. Congress should remedy this negative effect of RLUIPA by
modifying the law.
B.

Potential Violations of the EstablishmentClause

In addition to the unwanted phenomenon of extrajudicial enforcement of
RLUIPA, the law's questionable constitutionality should compel Congress to
act. While the law as written would not likely be declared unconstitutional, the
law's applicability to auxiliary uses-without regard to their relationship to a
religious, educational, or charitable mission of a religious institution-may
well be incompatible with the Establishment Clause.
The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.'' 139 As Walz recognizes, government
may exercise "benevolent neutrality" to accommodate impositions of
government on religious institutions. 40 In explaining this term, the Supreme
build two chapels, a book store, TV and radio broadcasting facilities, Christian museum, a fellowship
hall for 1000 people, and a food court. Voices of Rockaway Township, Inc., Facts and Fiction
Regarding the Voices of Rockaway Township, http://www.voicesofrockawaytwp.org/pages/4/index.htm
(last visited Dec. 15, 2005).
137. See Chadwick, supra note 135.
138. See Alicia Zadrozny, Christ Church Submits New Plans for Rockaway, MONTCLAIR TIMES
=
(N.J.), Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.montclairtimes.com/page.php?page 10220.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
140. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970).
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Court noted that "there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference." 141 As part of the "play in the joints," the neutrality
1 42
principle does not preclude government from taking religion into account.
However, it does preclude government from favoring one religion over another.
Moreover, and most importantly for our purposes, it prevents the government
from favoring religion over irreligion.
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, the
Supreme Court held that "a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause
[is] that government should not prefer ...religion to irreligion. ' '143 Kiryas Joel
involved a New York statute that created a special school district in which
members of a particular religious sect could educate their children. 44 The
Court found that this kind of "legislative favoritism"'14 5 violated the neutrality
principle of the Establishment Clause, crossing the line "from permissible
accommodation to impermissible establishment. 1 46 Justice Stevens elaborated
on this notion in his concurrence in Boerne, the decision that invalidated
RFRA. Alone among his peers, he argued that RFRA violated the
Establishment Clause because "the statute has provided the Church with a legal
weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for
' 47
religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.'
While Stevens' statements were dicta, they are helpful in understanding the
irreligion-religion conceptual framework.
Following the logic of Kiryas Joel and Justice Stevens, one could argue that
the accommodation of auxiliary uses under RLUIPA-particularly those not
substantially related to a religious institution's religious, educational, or
charitable goals-goes beyond benevolent neutrality. To the extent that
RLUIPA as applied could protect auxiliary enterprises that are merely
tangential to a religious institution's mission-enterprises like fast food
restaurants and banks-the law could be thought to demonstrate "legislative
favoritism" of religious over irreligious uses. This is because the law confers
special and economically valuable benefits on these enterprises solely on the
basis of their relationship to a religious institution-despite the fact that such
relationships might be merely peripheral. By permitting religious institutions to

141. Id.at 669.
142. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (allowing, as "play in the joints," a state's
denial of scholarships to students majoring in theology because the state was attempting to avoid
Establishment Clause concerns).
143. 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (holding that the drawing of a special school district that served only
members a religious sect violated the Establishment Clause).
144. Id.at 690.
145. Id. at 704.
146. Id.at 710.
147. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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locate auxiliary enterprises in advantageous but otherwise restricted locations,
RLUIPA may put competing enterprises at an economic disadvantage. While
the question has not yet arisen in litigation, a court faced with such facts could
rightly find RLUIPA, as applied, to violate the "no preference" jurisprudence
of the Establishment Clause.
It is necessary to emphasize here that this Note does not argue that
RLUIPA as written violates the religion-irreligion framework. The law
includes a provision, entitled "Establishment Clause Unaffected," which
provides, "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in
any way address that portion of the First Amendment to the Constitution
prohibiting laws respecting an establishment of religion [the Establishment
4 Indeed, most courts considering facial challenges
Clause]. ,,148
have declined to
find RLUIPA unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds. 149 Moreover,
the Supreme Court, in Cutter v. Wilkinson, recently upheld RLUIPA's
institutionalized persons provisions against an Establishment Clause
challenge. 150 The Court emphasized that its holding applied only to facial
challenges and not to future claims that applying RLUIPA would produce
unconstitutional results. 151 The Court also said that as-applied challenges would
be in order if "inmate requests for religious accommodations become
excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized
persons, or
152
jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution."'
The Supreme Court has never ruled on RLUIPA's land use provisions, but
Cutter suggests that the Court would be sympathetic to Establishment Clause
challenges alleging that RLUIPA as applied produces effects that favor religion
over irreligion. This Note has chronicled how RLUIPA already produces such
effects and predicts more of the same. RLUIPA's application to auxiliary uses
must therefore
be clarified in order to satisfy the demands of the Establishment
53
Clause.1

148. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-4 (Supp.
2003).
149. See, e.g., Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that with RLUIPA,
"Congress has simply lifted government burdens on religious exercise and thereby facilitated free
exercise of religion for those who wish to practice their faiths"); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of
Mamaroneck. 280 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that RLUIPA meets the standard set
forth in Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), for determining violations of the Establishment
Clause), vacated on other grounds, 386 F.3d 183 (2nd Cir. 2004); Life Teen, Inc. v. Yavapai County,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24363 at *49-50 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2003).
150. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
151. Seeid.at2124.
152. Id. at 2125.
153. See Ada-Marie Walsh, Note, Religious Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act of 2000:
Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189, 201-207 (2001) (arguing that

RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause because it "favors all religious groups over those groups
without religious affiliation" and thus benefits only religious groups).
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IV. MODIFYING RLUIPA TO BETTER ADDRESS AUXILIARY USE CLAIMS

Congress should modify the land use provisions of RLUIPA to ensure that
it properly differentiates between those auxiliary uses that are substantially
related to the religious, educational, or charitable mission of a religious
institution and those that are only tangentially related. Congress could achieve
this goal in two ways. One way is to reinstate the centrality-of-belief standard
to determine whether religious exercise is implicated and to establish a
uniform, high standard for proving the substantiality of a burden. Such a
change, while supported by pre-RLUIPA case law, may be difficult to achieve
given Congress's express elimination of the centrality-of-belief standard and
given the possibility that these changes would affect worship uses in a way that
Congress did not intend. However, another way is to create a new provision in
the law that applies only to non-worship auxiliary uses. Such a provision would
rightly restrict RLUIPA's applicability to those auxiliary uses that are
substantially related to the religious, educational, or charitable mission of a
religious institution. A new provision could also be narrowly tailored to address
auxiliary uses to avoid adverse effects on other parts of the law.
A.

Reinstating Centrality-of-Beliefand Standardizingthe SubstantialBurden
Analysis

As one option, Congress could amend the text of RLUIPA to establish a
higher bar for a religious institution that hopes to prevail on a claim that a
given land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on it via an auxiliary
use. Congress could amend the law in precisely the places where this Note has
observed ambiguities: first, in reinstating the pre-RLUIPA centrality-of-belief
standard, and second, in establishing a uniform, high standard for showing a
substantial burden.
To reinstate the centrality-of-belief standard, Congress would have to
change § 2000cc-5(7)(A), which offers a definition of religious exercise that
includes "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief."'' 54 Congress could modify this language to define
religious exercise as "any exercise of religion that is either compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief." Congress would also have to modify
§ 2000cc-5(7)(B), which mandates that "[t]he use, building, or conversion of
real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be
religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property
for that purpose."'1 55 Instead of wording this section as an unequivocal mandate,

154. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)
(Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
155. § 2000cc-5(7)(B).
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Congress should either change the word "shall" to "may" or should add
language consistent with the modification suggested for subsection (A). Such
additional language, added to the end of the section, could be: "so long as such
use, building, or conversion is compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief." Either of these alternatives could limit the ability of certain auxiliary
uses to take advantage of RLUIPA, while still providing protections to others.
To enact a uniform standard for demonstrating a substantial burden,
Congress could add a definition for "substantial burden" to § 2000cc-5. If its
goal is to create a high bar, Congress could model its definition for substantial
burden on the C.L.UB. formulation.' 56 Such a definition could be: "(8)
Substantial Burden. The term 'substantial burden' means a burden that
necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering
religious exercise as defined herein effectively impracticable." This definition
would help in making the substantial burden analysis more uniform in RLUIPA
cases.
However, there are several reasons to think that these changes are not
feasible. Congress, in drafting RLUIPA, did not simply ignore the centralityof-belief standard: it explicitly stated that this standard did not apply. To expect
Congress to significantly change one of the statute's most critical definitions,
that of religious exercise, may be asking too much. Similarly, RLUIPA's
framers explicitly declined to define "substantial burden." They stated: "The
Act does not include a definition of the term 'substantial burden' because it is
not the intent of this Act to create a new standard for the definition of
'substantial burden' on religious exercise."'s57 Even the argument that a
definition for substantial burden would simplify case law under RLUIPA may
not convince today's Congress to contravene its predecessor's explicitly stated
intentions. Moreover, these changes might also affect non-auxiliary uses-that
is, they may affect strictly worship facilities-in ways that Congress did not
intend and this Note has not considered. Accordingly, this first option may
have limited success and be an unwise choice.
B.

Creatinga New Provision To Specifically Address Auxiliary Uses

A more feasible and better solution might be for Congress to write an
entirely new provision for RLUIPA--one that specifically and narrowly
addresses the concerns of this Note. Such a provision could state: "An auxiliary
use affiliated with a religious institution [constitutes religious exercise and may
receive protection under this statute] only if it is shown to substantially relate to
the religious, educational, or charitable mission of that religious institution."

156. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied,541 U.S. 1096 (2004).
157. See supranote 83, at S7776.
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Such a provision would require a definition of "auxiliary use" as any nonworship use, to be added in § 2000cc-5. It would also require a statement that
other provisions of RLUIPA apply pursuant to the limitation in the new
provision and that the new provision is the sole criteria for determining whether
an auxiliary use should obtain RLUIPA's protections.
The "substantial relationship" standard offered in this suggested language
has been used by the government in other circumstances where the relationship
between an auxiliary use and its affiliated religious institution is important. One
could hardly expect government not to impose such a standard given the extent
to which government supports religious institutions. Federal, state, and local
governments financially support religious institutions with tax breaks, public
health funding, and education aid. 158 Governmental assistance also reaches
religious institutions through "Medicare, Medicaid, and educational programs,
such as the Pell Grant program for low income post-secondary students and the
G.I. Bill of Rights for veterans." 159 To ensure that this assistance reaches the
most relevant parts of a religious institution, government has reserved the right
to differentiate between its activities.
With regard to taxes, for example, the government allows religious
institutions to obtain tax-exempt status except on unrelated business income
that is not "substantially related" to the religious institution's religious,
educational or charitable purposes. 16 A body of regulatory and judicial case
law now provides standards for evaluating whether a relationship is substantial
using individualized facts.1 61 According to regulations from the Department of
the Treasury, trade or business activities are related to a religious institution's
charitable exempt purpose if they are causally connected to achieving an
important exempt purpose of the organization (other than through the
generation of income), and if that causal connection is substantial. 162 The
Supreme Court has noted that the purpose of such restrictions is "to restrain the
unfair competition fostered by the tax laws" and to combat "perceived abuses
of the tax laws by tax-exempt organizations that engaged in profit-making
activities."' 163 Equitable principles suggest that RLUIPA is unfairly giving
158. For a legal analysis of this proposition, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 665-667
(2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. Laura Athens, Is the Wall Between Church and State Crumbling?, 81 MICH. BAR J., Sept.
2002, at 18, 21.

160. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2000).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 849-50 (1986) (finding that
the advertisements in the journal of a nonprofit organization do not substantially relate to the
organization's exempt educational purposes, and thus income from such advertisements is taxable).
162. See I.R.C. § 513(d)(2) (2000). This provision of the regulations goes onto state: "Thus, for the
conduct of trade or business from which a particular amount of gross income is derived to be
substantially related to purposes for which exemption is granted, the production or distribution of the
goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of those purposes." Id. (emphasis added).
163. Am. CoIl, of Physicians,475 U.S. at 838.
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entities affiliated with religious institutions competitive advantages over nonaffiliated entities. Accordingly, Congress may find the substantial relationship
standard an appropriate and persuasive analogy with regard to auxiliary uses
under the land use provisions of RLUIPA.
Creating an entirely new provision would also help RLUIPA to better
address the issue of auxiliary uses without affecting other provisions of the
statute. It would provide a uniform standard of assessing their relationship to a
religious institution's mission where none currently exists. A substantial
relationship standard would comport with and could draw from other areas of
the law, like federal tax exemption criteria. And it would codify the correct
findings (though not necessarily the same standards of review) of cases like
Castle Hills and Westchester Day School that restrict RLUIPA's protections
with regard to auxiliary uses. 164
Whether motivated by a constitutional defect or motivated by concern for
uniformity, changes to RLUIPA would not be inconsistent with the views of
the law's framers-who, after all, recognized that "not every activity carried
out by a religious entity or individual constitutes "religious exercise. ,,165
Indeed, they specifically advanced the notion that tangentially related auxiliary
uses should be excluded from RLUIPA's scope. It is unclear why they failed to
reflect this notion in the language of the statute-perhaps, as some suggest,
they were unable to thoroughly consider the issue.' 66 Had the law's framers
realized the potential impact of their omission, they might have themselves
amended the bill in this way that this Note suggests.
CONCLUSION

Auxiliary uses have become an increasingly important component of
religious life in America. Religious institutions now serve not only as spiritual
destinations, but they also provide congregants with a host of personal,
medical, educational, and even financial services. They are building larger
facilities, sometimes in dense urban areas but more often in the sprawling
suburbs, where land use battles will become more heated as development
pushes outward. 167 While trends in auxiliary usage are not easy to assess, it
seems certain that the legal and land use conflicts they occasion will only grow
as time passes. What will changes in modem religious institutions-more of
which are establishing auxiliary uses-mean for religious rights laws?

164. See supra Section I.C.
165. See supra note 83, at S7776; see generally supra Subsection II.A.2.
166. See Hamilton, supra note 61, at 342-44 (arguing that the framers took little time to investigate

such matters and describing the process by which representatives stretched a few anecdotal examples to
justify the law's enactment).
167. As one indicator, nearly three-quarters of megachurches are located in the suburbs. See
Thumma, supranote 16.

RLUIPA and Auxiliary Uses

RLUIPA, one of the most important religious rights law, fails to address
adequately the increasingly important question of auxiliary uses, both by
omitting mention of auxiliary uses in the statutory text and by providing
ambiguous standards by which to adjudicate claims brought under the law. This
Note has chronicled the inability of courts to limit RLUIPA's applicability
without Congress's help. And it has shown that RLUIPA's generous strict
scrutiny protection of religious institutions should not be extended to include
all auxiliary uses, in part because doing so could violate the Establishment
Clause.
To save RLUIPA from constitutional challenges and to more fairly apply
its protections, Congress must modify the law. It is realistically feasible for
Congress to add a provision that differentiates among religious institutions'
auxiliary use claims by imposing a requirement that uses receiving RLUIPA's
protections be substantially related to a religious institution. This Note has
argued that such a modification is not inconsistent with the framers' intent.
Moreover, such a modification can prevent religious institutions from
effectively becoming-at least with regard to land use-a law unto themselves.

